Is truth truly valuable? Assuming we are talking about practical usefulness here, one could argue that truth is valuable because it helps us navigate the world more effectively. For example, if we have accurate information about a situation, we can make better decisions and take appropriate action. On the other hand, if we have false or misleading information, we may make mistakes that could have serious consequences.
We could also look at specific instances where truth has played a role in improving outcomes. For example, scientific discoveries and technological advancements have been made possible by the pursuit of truth and the desire to uncover new knowledge. Similarly, in personal relationships, honesty and transparency are often seen as essential components of building trust and strengthening bonds.
There seems to be some evidence to suggest that truth is generally beneficial and worth pursuing. You may be surprised, dear reader, but I believe that the matter is not so simple.
So far, we have talked about "the truth" as if it were clear what that even means. In order to avoid making things too complicated - and perhaps unanswerable - we could look not at the value of truth itself, but at the value of individual instances of truth - concrete truths, so to speak.
If truth is valuable (practically, epistemologically, perhaps even morally...) in general, then concrete instances of truth should be valuable as well. Isn't that right? For example, if we assert that 'It is true that p', and this assertion is itself true with respect to some specific proposition p, then it must be valuable or good, if truth were generally valuable.
To explore this idea, let's examine some concrete value judgments related to facts (1.a), knowledge (1.b), and truth (1.c):
(1)
(a) It's good that it's raining.
(b) It's good to know that it's raining.
(c) It's good that it's true that it's raining.
Statements (1.a) and (1.b) are well-formed and common. In fact, there may be situations in which (1.a) is false but (1.b) is true. For example, we might be indoors and not need to worry about getting wet. But (1.c) is more interesting, as it challenges the so-called truth conditional:
(2)
Truth conditional: It is true that p if and only if p.
By applying the truth conditional to (1.c), we arrive at (1.a), meaning that (1.c) is true if and only if (1.a) is true. In other words, if it's good that it's raining, then it's good that it's true that it's raining.
This might seem like a circular argument, as it suggests that the value of truth is derived solely from the things we value firsthand, rather than being an intrinsic value. To put it another way:
(3)
The value of truth: If p is good, then it is good that it is true that p.
This raises the question of whether we truly value truth as an abstract concept. Could it not be the case that we do not value truth as such, but that what we really care about are beliefs? Should we not strive to possess true beliefs and avoid false ones?
After all, we make better decisions when our beliefs are accurate. When our beliefs are wrong, it can lead to all sorts of negative consequences. So, perhaps it's not the value of truth as such that we should be concerned with, but rather the value of true beliefs. Let's examine this claim in more detail with a specific example - an instance of a true belief, so to speak:
(4)
It is good that the belief that it rains is true.
If the belief that it rains is true, then this seems to be valueable. But this is not what (4) says. It appears as if (4) is only true if it is good that it is raining - and that has nothing to do with the value of truth or the value of true beliefs, but with the value of rain.
Let’s again have a closer look on some principles that should apply here:
(5)
True beliefs: The belief that p is true iff p.
Applying the principle “True beliefs” to (4), we can derive the following:
(6)
It is good that the belief that it rains is true iff it's good that it's raining.
That's what we already suspected: the supposed value of a true belief consists in the value of what it is about. This can be summarized as follows:
(7)
The value of true beliefs: If it is good that p then it is good that the belief that p is true.
And this shows that true beliefs don’t have value in themselves. It’s the things we value, and not (true) beliefs about them.
There are no controversial assumptions in this discussion, and it is not overly complex. It simply combines value statements with two different forms of the truth conditional without heavy use of logical machinery.
Yet, the conclusions are surprising. Are we willing to accept that neither truth nor true beliefs hold any value in themselves? Contrary to what most of us might assume?