Value statements emphasized
Value statements emphasized
Is it good to marry someone? It depends on your alternatives.
Meet Klaus, a man who values his independence and chooses to remain single. However, his aunt Ursula has left him a substantial inheritance in her will, but with a catch: he must be married by the age of 30 to receive it. In need of money, Klaus finds a solution by marrying Berta, a fellow adventurer who shares his passion for archaeology and frequently travels abroad, allowing Klaus to maintain his desired lifestyle.
Consider Klaus' solution to his financial predicament. While it may seem reasonable, we must question its true value. To do so, let's examine the following statements, with the constituent in focus indicated in square brackets:
(1)
It is good that Klaus married [Berta].
(2)
It is good that Klaus [married] Berta.
In Klaus' situation, it seems that (1) holds true while (2) is false. These two sentences, despite their identical wording, convey different meanings.
To understand why, we can explore the reasons behind them. Perhaps, (1) is true because Klaus married Berta, who is frequently away from home, allowing him to maintain his single lifestyle. However, (2) is false because Klaus, a self-proclaimed bachelor, should not have married anyone at all.
These two value statements are related to different reasons, despite their similar wording. Essentially, (1) is equivalent to (3), while (2) is equivalent to (4):
(3)
Given the various people he could have married: it is good for Klaus that he chose to marry Berta.
(4)
Given his commitment to a single lifestyle: it is good for Klaus that he chose to marry Berta.
Assuming we are correct so far, it seems reasonable to suggest that the focus of a statement works to relativize a value statement to a particular set of reasons, which are tied to the emphasized constituent and further specified by the surrounding context.
However, standard semantics cannot account for the nuanced difference in meaning between sentences (1) and (2). Therefore, we require a non-standard semantics capable of accommodating focus-related meanings.
Two theories, in particular, could be applied: the theory of structured meanings, mainly developed by A. von Stechow, and alternative semantics, developed by M. Rooth. For the sake of simplicity, I will utilize the former theory.
The theory of structured meanings proposes that isolating one or more constituents of a sentence through focus partitions the sentence's meaning into two distinct sets: a background meaning and a thematic meaning. The background meaning is obtained through lambda abstraction over the focused constituents, while the thematic meaning is defined as the value of the focused constituents.
By applying this theory to sentences (1) and (2), we can display their focus-related meanings as an ordered pair in the format <background meaning, thematic meaning>. The expressions are as follows ([[α]]f represents the focus-induced meaning of α):
(5)
[[“Klaus married [Berta]”]]f = <λy. marry'(k,y), b>
[[“Klaus [married] Bertha”]]f = <λP. P'(k, b), λxy. marry'(y,x)>
What role do focus-related meanings play in determining the truth conditions of value statements?
Consider example (1), where the focused component, Berta, implies a comparison to all other viable marriage candidates, represented by λy. marry'(k,y). Consequently, the truth conditions of (1) attribute special qualities to Berta that justify Klaus' favorable view towards her.
On the other hand, in example (2), the component "to marry" defines the thematic meaning and necessitates the distinction of all other alternative relationships between Klaus and Berta represented in the background meaning.
If Klaus valued no other relationship with Berta more than marriage, it would justify his desire to marry her. However, as this is not the case, such a sentiment would be unwarranted, which is why (2) is deemed false, in accordance with our intuition.
What is the technical significance of these insights? How can we express the truth conditions of value statements? To begin, we can use the following formula as a useful starting point:
(6)
[["It is good that S"]] in w1 = 1 iff there is a world w2 and a subject a such that
[[S]] in w1 = 1 (factivity condition);
[[Φ(a, S)]] in w2 = 1, where Φ is a pro-attitude and w1 and w2 are broadly similar (essential condition); and
it is appropriate to have a pro-attitude with content p (appropriateness condition).
Condition (1) captures the factivity of propositional value statements. When you utter a sentence of the form “It is good that p.”, you presuppose that p is true. Therefore, the sentence “It is good that the earth is flat.” is neither true nor false because its presupposition that the earth is flat isn't satisfied.
Condition (2) captures the essential requirement for something to be valuable. Namely, there must be someone who values it - i.e. has a pro-attitude towards something described by S.
However, this is not always strictly required. Values don't cease to exist just because nobody values them at a particular moment. Values are dependent on but not identical to appreciation.
For this reason, I added another broadly similar world w2: actual appreciation is not always required, but it should not be an outlandish attitude within the situation under consideration.
You might be wondering why condition (3) is necessary. The proposition p is not specified, and it is unclear how p relates to S. Aren't values simply the things we appreciate?
Unfortunately, this is not always the case. We could appreciate something wrongly that is not worth valuing. Values require justification; they don't appear out of thin air. This is what condition (3) aims to capture.
To further clarify, we can rely on our previous discussion of focus-induced meanings. Assuming background meaning α and thematic meaning β, a plausible assumption would be the following:
(7)
It is appropriate to have a pro-attitude with content p iff: if [[S]]f = <α, β>, then there is a good reason for α(β) = p, such that it there is no good reason for any other proposition α(γ), with γ ≠ β.
The third condition is crucially based on the focus effect, stating that there is an appropriate pro-attitude only towards the proposition that is the object of a value statement, but not towards alternative propositions that we get when we substitute the focus position with other entities of the same type.
In the case of (1), this would mean that Klaus has a good reason to marry Berta (since he gets the inheritance and can still live mostly alone), but no good reason to marry Luise, Andrea, or Brigitte instead.
However, upon closer inspection, this approach turns out to be inadequate. The truth of (1) does not rule out the possibility that it might have been just as desirable for Klaus to marry Hannah instead of Berta, for instance, if Hannah is a famous marine biologist who is never around. Thus, the condition is too strong.
It seems that both Berta and Hannah would be good marriage candidates for Klaus. This, however, does not imply that choosing one necessarily rules out the other.
We must allow for other alternatives, for which equally good reasons could be found. We can do that by weakening (7) to (8):
(8)
It is appropriate to have a pro-attitude with content p iff: if [[S]]f = <α, β>, then there is a good reason for α(β) = p, such that this good reason doesn’t exist for another proposition α(γ), with γ ≠ β.
This suggestion, however, makes sentences like (1) too easily true. For instance, imagine Klaus and all potential marriage candidates are archaeologists, and one of them, Brigitte, is ruled out as a marriage candidate because she is a lesbian.
Under such circumstances, the mere existence of Brigitte would make (1) true since Klaus can't find good reasons for a marriage proposal with her.
This is not the desired outcome, and it shows that (8) is too weak.
To address this issue, we can refine condition (8) by adding a relevance requirement, as follows:
(9)
It is appropriate to have a pro-attitude with content p iff: if [[S]]f = <α, β>, then there is a good reason for α(β) = p, such that it there is no such good reason for any other proposition α(γ), where γ is a relevant alternative to β but ≠ β.
This means that the alternatives must be not only undesirable but also relevant to the value statement in question. This condition strikes a balance between being too weak and too strong, as it allows for appropriate pro-attitudes to be context-dependent and sensitive to the relevant alternatives.
This analysis renders (1) true only if Klaus has a reason to marry Berta that he would not have with respect to other women who are marriage candidates, because they would stay home more often instead.
The presence of an alternative marriage candidate like Hannah, who is too similar to Berta, would not count as a relevant alternative. Brigitte, on the other hand, would not count as an alternative at all, as she is not a marriage candidate.
For (2), (9) would render it true only if Klaus has a reason to marry Berta that he would not have if he married someone else. Since this is not the case, (2) would turn out to be false, as expected.
If we were to exclude focus-induced meanings from our analysis of value statements, then the third condition could be simplified to:
(10)
It is appropriate to have a pro-attitude with content p iff [[S]] = p, and there is a good reason for p.
Let’s assume:
(11)
It is good that Klaus married Berta.
Based on my analysis so far, (11) would be true if (a) Klaus married Berta, (b) marrying Berta isn't undesirable in general, and (c) he had good reasons for doing so.
While all three conditions are fulfilled, this explanation isn't entirely satisfying because the reasons for marrying someone are typically a mixed bag. Klaus likely had reasons for and against marrying Berta, and another person might have been a better match for him.
This creates what I call the "Mixed Bag Problem" (MBP).
The MBP cannot be easily resolved. If the reasons for doing something are mixed, it means there are good reasons for both p and non-p.
Strengthening (10) by requiring there are no good reasons for non-p would result in too few valuable things.
Requiring there be no alternative to p for which there are good reasons would be even worse, as there would be at most one valuable thing, and likely none at all.
Intuitively, if p is good or valuable, then there should be better reasons for p than for non-p. All things considered, it's better for Klaus to marry Berta. He can have his cake and eat it too. This idea is captured in (12):
(13)
It is appropriate to have a pro-attitude with content p iff [[S]] = p, and there are better reasons for p than for non-p, all things considered.
While the initial impression may seem positive, upon closer examination, I believe it falls short. Let us assume that propositions are sets of possible worlds, where p denotes all possible worlds where p is true. The set of possible worlds where non-p is true is enormous.
What could happen to Klaus in these worlds where he doesn't marry Berta? All kinds of extremely positive and extremely negative outcomes could occur, along with everything in between. What reasons could there be for choosing p-worlds over non-p-worlds given such vast sets of possible worlds?
I don't know, honestly.
It appears that utilizing focus in value statements makes the semantics more complex and the decision-making process simpler. Conversely, forgoing emphasis has the opposite effect.
In practice, decisions are critical, not semantics. Therefore, it is advisable to use focus to narrow down the relevant alternatives.