This is the fourth installment in my series on power. I will explore the intricacies of power attributions, building upon the perspective of power introduced in the second part of this series. My earlier understanding, henceforth referred to as the coarse-grained view of power, is a useful model but fails to capture the full complexity of power ascriptions.
Throughout this piece, I will illustrate that the coarse-grained perspective is not sufficient to unpack all the subtle nuances involved in attributing power. To demonstrate this, I will present a variety of scenarios that highlight the limitations of this view.
In response to these limitations, I propose an enhancement: the addition of a second conversational background, or what Angelika Kratzer calls an 'ordering source.' By integrating ordering sources into the model, we can use them to further analyze power attributions and thus move towards a more refined, or: fine-grained view of power. This progression is the main goal of this article.
However, it's crucial to acknowledge that this fine-grained perspective isn't necessarily superior to its coarse-grained counterpart. Instead, they supplement each other, each one being more appropriate in different situations or under specific viewpoints.
Given that power attributions can be seen as true according to one view and false under another, it's clear that power is not a wholly objective feature of reality. This point underlines one of the primary arguments I hope to establish: power is an inherently fuzzy concept. The process of attributing power often resembles a negotiation, dependent on the immediate stakes and the strength of the claims involved.
With this understanding, let's delve into what has been proposed so far.
The coarse grained view of power
Statements about power can be reduced to statements about what actions are available to a person or group, i.e. what they can or cannot do. I called this thesis the deflationary definition of power:
(1)
Deflationary Definition of Power: An actor A has the power to do H in w iff A can do H in w.
According to this definition, we can reduce sentences about power to sentences about what can be done. The non-relational “A has power.” can be reduced to “There is something A can do.”
Furthermore, I suggested analyzing statements in the form of “A can do H” (the explanans) through the lens of relative modality, as introduced by Angelika Kratzer.1 In this approach, modal expressions such as 'can' or 'must' are evaluated against what Kratzer describes as conversational backgrounds. These backgrounds encompass implicit and explicit assumptions about our knowledge, norms, typical scenarios, etc.
I proposed that when we’re interpreting "A can do H." in the context of attributing power, the conversational background pertains assumptions about A's scope of action at the situation we are evaluating (i.e. in w).
Kratzer termed this conversational background a ‘modal base’. A modal base comprises propositions that articulate facts about A’s range of actions in the situation or world under scrutiny. Essentially, a modal base is a function that takes a world w (the scenario where A is placed) as an input and produces a set of propositions (assumptions about A’s scope of action in that scenario) as an output. Formally, this can be represented as:2
(2)
Modal Base: f(w) = {P: P is a proposition expressing A’s attributes, resources, positions, connections, situational aspects, abilities, skills, etc., that enable A to perform H in w}
In semantics, it’s customary to employ the concept of possible worlds to represent propositions. Here, a proposition P refers to a set of possible worlds where P holds true. The intersection of the propositions that belong to a modal base, viewed as sets of possible worlds, results in a set of worlds that are consistent with all the assumptions or conditions we consider to be part of w. This set is denoted as ⋂f(w), and is referred to as the modal base set.
This shift from a collection of propositions (modal base) to a modal base set is warranted because the context for evaluating modal statements should satisfy all our assumptions.
Consider an analogy: pondering if we can bake a cake right now. To bake a cake, essential ingredients such as eggs, milk, flour, yeast, and sugar are required. The modal base, in this instance, would be a checklist indicating the availability of ingredients for each day. For example, if eggs, milk, and flour are available on Monday (represented as "w1"), each item corresponds to a proposition like “I have eggs” or “I have milk,” and so on.
Each item, taken individually, holds true on different days. For instance, “milk” might be true on Monday but not on Tuesday. Within this analogy, propositions can be visualized as lists of days. If milk is available on Monday, Thursday, and Saturday, the entry “milk” can be represented as {Monday, Thursday, Saturday}. Similarly, the entry “eggs” could be represented by another list like {Monday, Tuesday, Friday, Sunday}.
If each necessary ingredient is represented as such a list, we can compute the intersection of these lists, generating a final list of days that are common to all ingredient lists. If Monday and Tuesday are common across all lists, the final list (representing our modal base set) would be {Monday, Tuesday}. These are the days when all the ingredients are at hand.
With this groundwork laid, we can elucidate what is meant by “A can do H”. This explanation hinges on the notion of 'truth conditions', which delineate the circumstances under which a statement is true or false. If my definition of power is accurate, it clarifies what it implies for someone to possess or lack power—that is, under what conditions he does or does not have power.
I have already touched upon truth conditions here, but I will reiterate them for clarity. For reasons that become apparent later, I would like to call this explanation of power the coarse-grained view of power:
(3)
Truth Conditions (coarse-grained view of power): [[A can do H]] in w = 1 iff there is a world w' ∈ ⋂f(w) such that [[A does H]] = 1 in w’.
Returning to the cake-baking example, the ability to bake a cake in a specific situation (on a particular day or in a possible world w) hinges on the availability of all the ingredients on that day. This implies that the question can be affirmed for those situations in which this is the case.
If our final list (the base modal set) includes Monday and Tuesday, then these are the days when baking a cake is feasible. On days not on this list (e.g., Saturday), baking a cake is not an option.
In this analogy, the truth condition would state: You can bake a cake on days that are included in your final list (and on other days, you cannot). Therefore, this example clarifies the circumstances under which baking a cake is possible. Correspondingly, if my definition of power is correct, it also explicates under what conditions one has the power to bake cakes. If you have grasped this concept, you have understood my approach thus far.
Susan’s predicament
Consider this scenario: Susan has invited Paul to her apartment for a glass of wine after their second date. The ambiance takes a romantic turn, and Susan is faced with the choice of either allowing the night to progress or asking Paul to leave. Eventually, she gives in to the moment and spends the night with Paul. The following morning, Susan confides in a friend, admitting that she felt unable to ask Paul to leave.
We can represent Susan's statement to her friend as follows (using the third person perspective and ignoring tense):
(4)
Susan can’t send Paul home.
At first glance, it seems that Susan indeed had the capacity to ask Paul to leave. She has the ability to communicate verbally, the mental capacity to make decisions, and the social authority as the host to ask a guest to depart.
Let's dissect whether Susan’s statement is a fabrication or an expression of her experience.
This discussion - just to make this clear - is not an examination of Susan’s conscious or subconscious decision to stay with Paul. The focus is not on her choices or actions. The point is that, despite having the option to act differently, she felt powerless to do so. I hope this distinction will be clear as we continue.
We must recognize that when evaluating an individual's capabilities, our assumptions about their skills and competencies are integral. These form part of the conversational background and should be taken into account when assessing Susan’s power in this situation.
The modal base here is a set of propositions representing the pertinent facts during the conversation between Susan and Paul. For instance:
P1: Susan communicates fluently and both she and Paul converse in a shared language.
P2: Susan has the cognitive ability to form intentions and make decisions, including the decision to ask Paul to leave.
P3: Susan, as the host, has the social authority to request her guest to leave - a norm that both acknowledge.
The modal base set incorporates all scenarios in which P1, P2, and P3 hold true. For instance:
In world w1, Susan is overwhelmingly attracted to Paul, with her emotions dominating any intention to ask him to leave.
In world w2, Susan is attracted to Paul but has reservations. After a brief internal struggle, she asks him to leave.
In world w3, Susan’s attraction to Paul is mild, and she resolutely asks him to leave.
The modal base set is thus:
(5)
⋂f(w) = {w1, w2, w3}
Since this set includes scenarios where Susan does ask Paul to leave (specifically, w2 and w3), statement (4) would be deemed false if we adopt the coarse-grained view of power. In such a case, we would have to conclude that Susan lied to her friend.
However, my intuitions suggest that Susan wasn’t lying. Her emotional state, characterized by arousal, seemingly barred her from accessing a scenario akin to w2 or w3. These scenarios were incongruent with her emotions towards Paul at that moment.
A balanced evaluation of Susan’s predicament would recognize the dual nature of her capacity: theoretically, she could have asked Paul to leave, but emotionally, she couldn't. She could have done it, but still, she couldn’t. Both perspectives hold a measure of truth, contingent upon the lens through which the situation is analyzed.
Indeterminate modal base sets
In analyzing scenarios like Susan’s, it is possible to argue that the spectrum of actions we attribute to her is ambiguous or indeterminate, encompassing various assumptions. We might consider her capabilities and skills, such as her capacity to communicate and make decisions, while also accounting for her emotional states and desires. Whether statement (4) is true or false hinges on our focus.
The proposition that we are toggling between distinct modal bases when evaluating Susan’s range of actions might elucidate our quandary in discerning what is genuinely within her power. Saying that she could have sent Paul home reflects one conversational background, whereas saying she couldn't reflects another.
I don't think this is a good strategy. Firstly, desires and emotions do not define a scope of action. What one is capable of doing at any given moment is not contingent on one's emotional or volitional state. For instance, an intense craving for sushi does not enable one to eat sushi if it is unavailable. Similarly, one can consume noodles despite a distaste for them. This aligns with the coarse grained view of power, according to which power is predicated on what one can do, not what one desires to do.
Additionally, Susan’s emotional state did not create new possibilities but constrained an existing choice. She had the option to either send Paul home or spend the night with him. Her emotional state influenced her preference but did not create these alternatives. Transitioning to a different modal base set is distinct from narrowing an existing modal base set.
So, what we're trying to say here is that given certain circumstances, one of the options became more probable than the other, and not that there were - depending on one's perspective - different types of options, which can be attributed to different sets of assumptions about Susan.
What we are attempting to articulate is that under certain circumstances, one alternative became more likely than the other. This is not indicative of disparate types of options attributable to varying assumptions about Susan.
To aptly express the subtleties in attributing power, we require a mechanism to appraise different alternatives based on certain criteria.
What we are grappling with here is a commonplace phenomenon. While we often have an array of options in most situations, bestowing us with considerable potential power, these options are not all equivalent. Some actions are more accessible, evident, or immediate, while others are demanding, carry grave consequences, or conflict with our self-concept and values.
With regard to this latter cases, there are instances where, contingent upon the circumstances, we might assert that it is beyond our power to execute the corresponding actions despite technically possessing the ability to do so. I believe this is what Susan was trying to convey to her friend.
Entering ordering sources
With the machinery that I have introduced so far, we cannot model such differences and nuances. However, we can do this within the framework provided by Kratzer. She posits that, when interpreting modals, there is a second conversational background, which I have so far neglected: an ordering source. This background allows us to capture finer distinctions.
Both conversational backgrounds play distinct roles when interpreting modal expressions. The modal base set includes a set of possible scenarios or ‘worlds’ consistent with our knowledge or assumptions. The ordering source ranks these worlds based on some standards, norms, likelihoods, or constraints. These also can be expressed as propositions.
Regarding power ascriptions, the ordering source could reflect the degree to which certain circumstances, f.i. A's volitional and emotional state, the social norms A contends with, and perhaps the risks associated with executing H, align with A’s performing H. We can represent this as:
(6)
Ordering Source: g(w) = {Q: Q is a proposition expressing how A's volitional and emotional state, the social norms A contends with, and the risks associated with executing H are aligned with A’s performing H in world w}
Consider Susan again. She is sexually aroused and finds Paul overwhelmingly attractive. This is an important piece of information that should be taken into account in assessing the present case. Let’s, therefore, assume the ordering source g in this situation contains the following proposition Q1:
(7)
g(w) = Q1 = Susan is sexually aroused and finds Paul overwhelmingly attractive.
Now, let's take the intersection of all propositions within g(w), denoted as ⋂g(w), which we call the ordering source set. In our case, g(w) contains just one proposition, so this set includes worlds in which Q1 is true.
We want to use the ordering source set ⋂g(w) to find the “best” worlds within the modal base set ⋂f(w) that align with ⋂g(w). This set of best worlds is denoted as MAX(w, f, g), defined as:3
(8)
Best Worlds: MAX(w, f, g) = {w' ∈ ⋂f(w): ∀w'' ∈ ⋂f(w) (if w'' ∈ ⋂g(w), then w' ∈ ⋂g(w))}.
This means we select worlds from the modal base set that are also in the ordering source set.
To illustrate, let's discuss baking cakes again. I am considering baking a cake. My world contains variables like the ingredients I have at home on different days. These variables create a set of possible scenarios. The intersection of these scenarios, represented as ⋂f(w), is a list of days I have all ingredients for baking a cake, for example, {Monday, Tuesday}.
We introduce the ordering source g(w), which refers to constraints and considerations when deciding to bake a cake, like my schedule and the rule that I can't bake if I have more than 3 appointments. The scenarios aligning with these constraints form ⋂g(w), represented as a list of days with at most 3 appointments.
For example, on Monday, I have the day off and all the ingredients. This scenario is part of ⋂f(w). Because I have no appointments, this scenario also aligns with ⋂g(w). Therefore, Monday belongs to MAX(w, f, g). On Tuesday, I have all ingredients but four appointments. While part of ⋂f(w), it does not align with ⋂g(w). Therefore, Tuesday doesn’t belong to MAX(w, f, g).
MAX(w, f, g) contains scenarios where I can bake a cake, and these scenarios meet the constraints of my schedule and rule about appointments. Here, only Monday fits into MAX(w, f, g), because for any other scenario in ⋂f(w) to be in MAX(w, f, g), it must also exist in ⋂g(w). Only Monday's scenario meets this criterion.
This example illustrates the concept of ‘best worlds’. The set (MAX(w, f, g)) is a subset of the modal base set (⋂f(w)) where the constraints in the ordering source set (⋂g(w)) are met.
Let’s return to Susan. Assume our modal base set includes the worlds w1, w2, and w3, as introduced above. We use Q1 to check whether it is true in w1, w2, and w3. As Q1 is clearly false in w3, w3 doesn’t belong to the set of best worlds. There might be some dispute over w2, as having reservations might not align with finding someone “overwhelmingly attractive.” Thus, Q1 likely isn’t true in w2 either. In w1, however, Q1 is true.
Thus, our set of best worlds contains only one world:
(9)
MAX(w, f, g) = {w1}
The final step to elucidate the fine-grained view of power is to state the truth conditions for "A can do H in w," utilizing the set of best worlds:
(10)
Truth Conditions (fine-grained view of power): [[A can do H]] in w = 1 iff there is a world w' ∈ MAX(w, f, g) such that [[A does H]] = 1 in w'.
This definition captures the intuition that A can do H if (i) A's comprehensive set of resources, capacities, skills, etc., enables A to do H, and (ii) H aligns with constraints relevant for A, f.i. his emotions, the social norms A accepts, and the risks A is willing to take.
Let’s revisit the question of whether I can bake a cake. This is determined by whether there exists a world within MAX(w, f, g) in which I bake a cake.
We established that only Monday aligns with my rules, schedule, and the ingredients that enable me to bake a cake. Thus, Monday falls into MAX(w, f, g), where I have all the ingredients, the day off, and no appointments. This means there’s a day on which me baking a cake is possible, and therefore, “I bake a cake.” is possible.
Note that the truth conditions require this to be true and not just possible. In this example, we only considered a small set of actual days, and didn’t consider every possible course of days. While the analogy breaks down here, the concept should be clear.
What about Susan? Did she lie to her friend? If she did, (4) should be false:
(4)
Susan can’t send Paul home.
Let’s apply our truth conditions to this case:
(11)
“Susan can’t send Paul home.” is true when she had Paul in her apartment after their second date iff “Susan doesn’t send Paul home.” is true in w1.
As this is the case, (4) is true. So, she didn’t lie. This demonstrates that the fine-grained view of power captures our intuitions more effectively, especially in cases where a more nuanced judgement is required.
The role of enabling and constraining conditions
Evidently, these two perspectives – the coarse and fine-grained views of power – differ in the metrics we utilize to assess what someone is capable of. The fact that the set MAX(w, f, g) is a subset of ⋂f(w) implies that a more fine-grained assessment leaves fewer options available than a coarser assessment, thereby reducing power.
This distinction has profound implications in everyday life. Once you acknowledge these differences, you begin to recognize them everywhere. At times, we exhibit a dash of heroic arrogance and boast about our capabilities – thus applying the coarse-grained view of power. Conversely, we occasionally adopt a victim mentality, complaining about our lack of options and frequent failures, thereby utilizing the fine-grained perspective.
Consider an ardent Trump supporter named John, who had to make a choice in the 2020 US presidential election. Technically, John had the power to vote for Biden. This action would merely involve marking his ballot differently. Here, we are taking the broad, coarse-grained view of power, which assesses possibility based on basic prerequisites, while ignoring emotional, psychological, or social factors.
On the other hand, John might find the idea of voting for Biden so abhorrent that he cannot bring himself to do it, despite having the technical ability. This is the fine-grained view of power, which takes into account not just John's physical capacity to vote for Biden, but also his emotional and psychological state, social pressures, and obligations to his chosen identity.
Essentially, within the broad set of all possible worlds that are consistent with the circumstances of the 2020 US predsidential election, ⋂f(w), there might exist a world where John votes for Biden. However, this world may not be part of the narrower set, MAX(w, f, g), which only includes the worlds that are additionally in alignment with John's emotions, social norms, and self-identity.
This distinction resonates closely with our intuitions. We want to make sure - and expect - that every voter can vote for every candidate on the ballot. And we also assume that this is irrelevant for some voters. For them, every day is a Monday, whatever the calendar says.
Now, let's consider Maria, in a similar situation but contemplating starting her own business. For Maria to entertain this idea, certain prerequisites exist. These include her business acumen, financial resources, professional network, societal status, and other situational elements enabling her business venture.
Simultaneously, Maria must contemplate several constraints. Does launching her own business align with her aspiration of self-sufficiency? Is she compliant with societal norms surrounding entrepreneurship? How risk-averse is she? Can she withstand the financial risks involved in entrepreneurship, even if she secures the necessary funds?
Are there considerable obstacles that impede Maria from realizing her goal? Could insurmountable risks, unbearable social pressure, or significant deviations from her plan deter Maria from starting her business, despite possessing the required 'ingredients' or resources?
With the fine-grained view of power, the emphasis lies on those worlds where these elements harmonize in a way that doesn't restrict Maria from accomplishing her goal. Conversely, the coarse-grained view focuses on those worlds where the necessary prerequisites for achieving this goal are fulfilled.
To employ more engaging terminology, I suggest calling the assumptions (propositions) utilized in determining the modal base set "enabling conditions," and the additional assumptions used in establishing the ordering source set "constraining conditions."
Enabling conditions must be met for there to even be a chance of performing H. Constraining conditions, however, vary significantly and can be either strong or weak. These conditions can – in theory – be overcome. You can't win a marathon if you're paraplegic. But if your athletic performance is average? That's debatable!
In what follows, I will discuss three features that can help us understand the nature and characteristics of these conditions:
a) You can, but you can’t
In various examples, I have addressed the question of whether someone possesses the power to perform a specific action. Could Susan have sent Paul home? Could I bake a cake? Could a die-hard Trump supporter vote for Biden? Could Maria start her own business?
In each of these deliberations, the conclusion could be that both scenarios are plausible if the following initial conditions apply: the enabling conditions are fulfilled, but there exist (strong) unmet constraining conditions. Under these circumstances, you can, but can’t.
Consider:
(12)
Susan: “Sure, I could have sent Paul home because he was my guest. But I couldn't. His charm was irresistible.”
Me: “Sure, I could have baked the cake because I had all the ingredients. But I couldn't. Time was against me.”
John: “Sure, I could have voted for Biden. His name was on the ballot. But I couldn't. That would have plunged me into a deep personal crisis.”
Maria: “Sure, I could have started my own business because I had a loan approval. But I couldn't. The financial risk was too high, and I didn't want to risk bankruptcy.”
b) C’mon, you can!
Constraining conditions are more susceptible to criticism than enabling conditions. Often, we justify our inaction by listing reasons that prevented us. These reasons are typically more accepted if we cite unfulfilled enabling conditions. However, if we cite constraining conditions, they are more likely to be challenged.
(13)
Susan: I couldn’t have sent Paul home because I was his guest.
Betty: I understand. You should host the meeting next time!Susan: I couldn't sent Paul home, because his charm was irresistible.
Betty: C’mon, he's not that charming, and he stutters!Me: I couldn’t have baked the cake because I had no eggs.
My friend: I understand. Be better prepared next time.Me: I couldn't have baked the cake because I didn't have time.
My friend: C’mon, it seems other things were higher on your priority list!John: I couldn’t have voted for Biden because he wasn’t on the ballot.
Mandy: I understand, but I wonder why he wasn’t.John: I couldn't have voted for Biden because that would have plunged me into a deep personal crisis.
Mandy: C’mon, you're exaggerating. Your vote wouldn't have tipped the election, and you know it!Maria: I couldn’t have started my own business because I didn’t get a loan approval.
Her husband: I understand. You could approach other banks. Maybe you haven't exhausted all your options yet.Maria: I couldn't have started my own business because the financial risk was too high for me.
Her husband: C’mon, the risk isn't that high. You're being too pessimistic!
Additionally, constraining conditions can come in many colors, they can be strong or weak, or even not acceptable at all. Consider the following two dialogues:
(14)
Susan: I couldn’t send Paul home after he complimented me.
Betty: That's ridiculous!John: I couldn't vote for Biden; his name reminded me of someone I dislike.
Mandy: You can't be serious!
This demonstrates that when we talk about constraints, we are in a gray area. Not all the things we perceive to limit our power actually do. The extent of the limitation often depends on the context. A coach of a slightly inferior team won't accept his players giving up; he'll motivate them to try harder. But when there's less at stake, minor constraints can be more acceptable.
c) The hero’s journey
A popular narrative device is the hero's journey, which hinges on the protagonist overcoming multiple obstacles and confronting various challenges. In wrestling with himself and tackling these impediments, the hero exceeds his limitations and eventually achieves his goal.
The story is a power game; our hero aspires to something but initially lacks the power to realize it. He only succeeds after overcoming the obstacles. These could either belong to the enabling conditions or the constraints of his actions. Most of the time, however, obstacles tend to be the latter. While ensuring that enabling conditions are met may seem uneventful, overcoming constraints usually leads to a more gripping story:
(15)
Story 1: It's my wife's birthday, and I want to make her happy. I know she would love a homemade cake. Unfortunately, I had no eggs in the fridge (obstacle). So, I went to the nearest supermarket and bought some. At last, I baked the cake and surprised my wife, much to her delight.
Story 2: It's my wife's birthday, and I want to make her happy. I know she would be thrilled with a homemade cake. My day was filled with important meetings and negotiations, and time was against me (obstacle). It took considerable effort, but I managed to keep the meetings short. The negotiation didn't go as smoothly as planned, but promising to write the minutes helped us conclude earlier than expected. Despite the time crunch, I managed to bake the cake. My wife was thrilled.
Neither story is a literary masterpiece, but that's not the point. The second story seems more engaging, right? Of course, the allure of a story greatly depends on the storyteller's skill. A skilled author can make even the overcoming of enabling conditions a compelling narrative.
Still, I believe that in most stories, the hurdles resemble strong constraints. Maybe this is because constraints inhabit a gray area, and thus it's not always clear whether the hero can overcome them. This ambiguity creates suspense. Enabling conditions, however, are more binary. Either I have eggs in the fridge, or I don't. Once the eggs are there, no additional effort is needed, and the suspense dissipates.
Power is an inherently fuzzy concept
The attribution of power is often a matter of "negotiation" and depending on what is at stake, we bring into play claims of varying strength.
Let's consider an example: Imagine a large, white square piece of paper, representing all potential actions one could undertake. Now, visualize a black circle within this white square, symbolizing the scope of actions a certain actor 'A' can perform within a specific situation. This black circle is a manifestation of A's power.
If this could be done, then the concept of power would behave like an ordinary set. The coarse-grained view of power provides - at least approximately - such an image. The modal base set is a black circle on a white sheet of paper.
My discussion so far has hopefully shown that the matter is not quite so simple. This is because it is often literally not so simple to do something that I - looking at it soberly - could do. The black circle is therefore not a circle with a sharp, but with a blurry edge, a gradient from dark to light, which embodies the varying challenges or obstacles involved in performing certain actions.
The lightest part of the gradient denotes tasks with substantial constraints, mostly outside the sphere of our power. As we move towards the center of the circle, the gradient becomes darker, signifying tasks with decreasing hurdles. Actions at the very center are easily accomplished with little to no effort.
Thus, power can be perceived as a fuzzy set, rather than a binary one. The variegated shades of gray depict the space where we possess some power, yet simultaneously face restrictions. These zones are often the subject of debates, disputes, and intriguing narratives.
Attempting to quantify someone's power is a futile exercise, as the nuances and subjectivity make it impossible to objectively measure. What seems feasible to one might appear impossible to another.
For instance, bending my index finger falls in the black area of absolute power, while time travel is in the unreachable white. Winning a kickboxing championship is a very light grey endeavor for me, suggesting the steep challenges. Conversely, mowing my lawn today would be a darker grey task, relatively easily accomplished.
Furthermore, the distinction between enabling and constraining conditions is itself blurred. What if I choose to bake a cake without milk? In a vegan perspective, this would be an obvious choice. Here, perhaps milk, usually considered an enabling condition, becomes a constraint, while another ingredient like flour is the enabler. This begs the question, is flour truly necessary for a cake? The possibilities are endless and the boundaries fluid.
I hope it's clear where this is going. Figuratively speaking, we can move the gray areas more and more into the white areas, which would mean that we take the stance that more is usually possible than we would assume.
But it also works the other way around. Perhaps what represents an overcomeable constraint for someone is an insurmountable hurdle in my eyes? Perhaps my meetings and negotiations always take longer than expected. Maybe too much depends on me really taking the time for it. And after all, baking a cake requires time. It can't be done without. We are moving the gray areas more and more into the black area. Perhaps I have much less power than I think I have?
These two different attitudes and maneuvers are sometimes called optimism and pessimism. An optimist thinks that more is possible - that more is within our power - than we believe. A pessimist claims the opposite. Who is right? I think, neither of them. Or maybe both!
For further references, please see my previous post.
The reason I often refer to a 'scope of action' is because the circumstances that enable an actor, A, to do something are multifaceted and multidimensional. Although we can categorize some of these circumstances (A's skills, health status, social roles, social network, tangible and intangible resources, prevalent social hierarchies, legal systems, etc.), it's my belief that such a list can never be exhaustive.
The phrase 'scope of action' attempts to bridge this gap, inherently encapsulating this vagueness. We can, of course, narrow down the 'scope of action' to specific circumstances - such as the tangible resources an actor possesses or can utilize - and discuss a particular type of power, perhaps economic power. While this approach can yield significant insights, it fails to capture the full extent of power an actor possesses in any given situation.
Readers familiar with Angelika Kratzer's theory might have noticed that I've simplified matters slightly. Kratzer doesn't use an ordering source set but employs a partial order ≼ on ⋂f(w), defined as follows:
For any two worlds w' and w'' in ⋂f(w): w' ≼ w'' iff for every proposition P in g(w) that is true in w'', P is also true in w'.
This implies that w' is at least as ideal as w'' if every standard or norm met by w'' is also met by w'. This generates a partial order of the potential worlds included in ⋂f(w). We can then isolate the set of "highest" worlds as follows:
MAX(≼, ⋂f(w)) = {w' ∈ ⋂f(w) | ¬∃w'' ∈ ⋂f(w) (w'' ≠ w' & ∀p ∈ g(w) (w' ∈ p → w'' ∈ p))}
Hence, MAX(≼, ⋂f(w)) constitutes the set of all worlds that exist in the intersection of the modal base set and are not inferior to any other world, i.e., the highest worlds as per the defined partial order.
The truth conditions of "can(P)" can subsequently be stated as:
[[can(P)]] = 1 in w iff ∃w' ∈ MAX(≼, ⋂f(w)) such that P = 1 in w'.
This is how Kratzer’s model works in general. The outcomes align with the approach I proposed. Although Kratzer’s procedure is more complex, it has the advantage of using such a (partial) order to make more refined comparisons, especially when assessing what is "more likely than something else".