Welcome to the first installment of a series on power relations. I find power to be a fascinating topic because it is complex and integral to our social structures. Although I am uncertain how many posts this series will include, I promise to keep you updated.
We often discuss power, but seldom do we take the time to fully explore its complex and multifaceted nature. Therefore, let us delve deeper and clarify what we mean when we use the term "power."
At its core, power refers to the ability to influence or control others. However, two distinct concepts of power are at play here.
The first, which I consider more fundamental, is the execution of power, whereby an individual asserts their will over others. Power can be executed in various ways, such as coercion, violence, persuasion, manipulation, or bribery.
On the other hand, there is the possession of power, where an individual may not necessarily execute power but has the potential to do so. This is often referred to as the power of influence.
I would like to begin this series by exploring authority, which refers to the power to perform important tasks, such as enacting laws or settling religious disputes.
Authority is a specific form of power and can have two different meanings: executing authority, which means carrying out authorized actions, and having or possessing authority, meaning the ability to do what others cannot.
Both concepts are intertwined and closely related to each other, but I will mainly concentrate on the first concept of authority: What does it mean that someone is authorized to do a range of things?
The reasons why I believe it is more productive to concentrate on influencing instead of having influence will become clearer in later installments. For now, let's start with a closer examination of authority.
Defining authority
Authority is the power or right to make decisions, give orders, and enforce obedience.
It is often associated with positions of leadership, such as a government official, a manager, a captain of a pirate ship or a priest, but can also refer to someone who has expertise or knowledge in a particular area.
Authority can be based on a variety of factors, such as legal or institutional power, social status, or personal qualities like charisma or expertise.
Authority is present in many different fields and contexts. It is an important aspect of social organization, as it allows individuals and institutions to exert control and influence over others in a structured and legitimate way.
It is also an essential part of social institutions and plays a significant role in shaping the norms and values of society.
The exercise of authority can have an impact on individuals and society, and its legitimacy is often a subject of debate and scrutiny.
I will not concern myself with what authority is based on or why it is respected. Those are interesting topics. Here, I want to focus on what authority is, or more specifically: what it means for someone to be authorized to do something.
Here are some examples of actions that require authoriy from various fields:
Government: The President of the United States issuing an executive order that carries the force of law.
Education: A teacher setting classroom rules and expectations, and enforcing consequences for breaking them.
Parenting: A parent setting boundaries and rules for their child's behavior, and enforcing consequences for disobedience.
Business: A manager making decisions about hiring, firing, promotions, and other personnel matters.
Law enforcement: A police officer arresting and detaining suspects, and using force if necessary to maintain order and protect the public.
Religion: A religious leader interpreting and teaching religious doctrine, and making decisions about matters such as marriage, divorce, and excommunication.
These are just a few examples. What they show is that having authority means that you’re entitled to perform certain actions that can bring about specific states or situations.
These states often have a normative status, meaning that certain rights or obligations are linked to the outcomes of authorized actions. For instance, entering into a contract, getting married, convicting a defendant, or being granted custody of a child are all examples of such actions having normative consequences.
The fact that someone has authority, therefore, includes two different aspects: he or she is firstly entitled to perform a specific range of actions (in a certain context), and the consequences or norms brought about by those actions are accepted as “binding” in a certain sense:
(1)
A person a has authority to do H in context C iff
(i) a is entitled to do H (in C), and
(ii) the consequences of H are accepted (in C).
Both conditions are necessary. Let's imagine a mutiny on a pirate ship. A gang of three sailors has conspired against captain Whitebeard, overpowering him and tying him to a mast.
They call the crew together, and the strongest of the three - called “Blackbeard” - orders in a commanding tone, "Set the sails!" The crew hesitates for a moment, but they are intimidated and begin to set the sails.
This means that the conspirator's words are interpreted as an order to set the sails in this situation. If the ship's cook - Sam Teaspoon - had shouted the same thing in a sunny afternoon, it would not have had any binding force and would have been interpreted at best as a playful role-playing game.
So, Blackbeards's words had normative consequences without him yet having the authority to give orders to his crew. He only exercised power over the other members of the crew through his physical strength and demonstration of his determination.
He could acquire authority in the next few days by declaring himself captain, and the others might accept it. But it is also possible that he may not succeed, and someone might throw him overboard to end the mutiny.
Although Whitebeartd tied to the mast still is entitled to give orders at this point, if no one follows him, his words do not count as orders to the crew. Entitlement alone doesn’t install authority.
I suspect that both conditions are sufficient for authority. If someone actually is entitled to perform a certain range actions (in a certain social context), and the consequences of those actions are accepted, then they have authority in that area. Let's examine the interplay between these factors in the following examples:
Legal authority: A judge has authority in a courtroom if (a) he is entitled to issue a sentence and (b) that sentence counts as legally binding.
Academic authority: A professor has authority in a classroom if (a) he is entitled to grade assignments and (b) those grades count as a measure of student achievement.
Managerial authority: A manager has authority in a workplace if (a) he is entitled to make hiring decisions and (b) his decisions count as the official hiring decisions.
Parental authority: A parent has authority in a household if (a) he is entitled to to set rules and (b) those rules count as expectations for behavior.
Political authority: A government has authority in a country if (a) it is entitled to to enact laws and (b) those laws count as binding regulations.
Religious authority: A religious leader has authority in a religious community if (a) he is entitled to interpret scripture and (b) his interpretation counts as the official doctrine.
Scientific authority: A researcher has authority in a field if (a) he is entitled to conduct experiments and (b) his findings from those experiments count as evidence.
In each of these examples, a person - such as a captain, coach, priest or manager - is granted the right to take specific actions within a particular context, and those actions result in a particular state of affairs or a socially binding norm.
To better understand the concept of authority, we must, therefore, analyze the relationships referred to in the two conditions. We need to examine what it means for a person to have the right to perform a range of actions within a specific context. Additionally, we must comprehend what it means for a particular action to be considered as setting a social norm.
Let's address these questions in this order.
Entitlement
Another way to express that someone has the right or entitlement to do something is by stating that he or she can do it. A judge can issue a verdict, but a lawyer cannot. The government can enact laws, but the local bowling club cannot.
To say that someone can do something involves using a statement with a modal force: it is possible that he or she does it, based on various circumstances and assessments.
Entitlements have certain analogies to permissions, obligations, or abilities. The following comparison clarifies this:
(2)
Peter can conclude the building society contract.
a. For all we know, Peter concludes the building society contract.
b. Peter is allowed to conclude the building society contract.
c. Peter is able to conclude the building society contract.
d. Peter is entitled to conclude the building society contract.
The paraphrases (2.a) to (2.d) suggest that the modal adverb can has not only the well-known epistemic (2.a), deontic (2.b), and dispositional interpretations (2.c), but also an interpretation in which it signifies having the right or entitlement to do something (2.d).
However, this does not yet establish whether entitlement is a distinct concept or not. It could be argued that entitlement is a particular form of permission or that it is similar to the ability to perform an action.
To explore this further, we need to examine whether entitlement constitutes an independent modal category alongside deontic and dispositional modality.
To begin with, it is important to clarify that permissions and entitlements are distinct from each other. Having permission to do H does not necessarily imply having the right to do H, and vice versa.
Makinson (1986, 408) examines a scenario where having the entitlement to do something does not entail having permission to do it:1
... consider the case of a priest of a certain religion who does not have permission, according to instructions issued by the ecclesiastical authorities, to marry two people, only one of whom is of that religion, unless they both promise to bring up the children in that religion. He may nevertheless have the power to marry the couple even in the absence of such a promise, in the sense that if he goes ahead and performs the ceremony, it still counts as a valid act of marriage under the rules of the same church ...
The other case, in which someone is allowed to do something he or she is not entitled to do, arises in all those cases where someone acts on behalf of another person.
The director of the institute, for instance, is authorized to invite the members of the institute to a council meeting. The act of inviting the members to the meeting may, however, be carried out by his secretary, as far as it is apparent that she is acting on behalf of her boss.
This is one of many cases where someone has permission to do something without being entitled to carry out such actions in general. It is not within the power of the secretary to convene an institute council meeting, although she is allowed to do so in certain situations.
The practical ability to perform actions that have a normative situation as a consequence is, again, neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for being entitled to perform such actions.
An actor may have the practical ability to marry a couple (for example, because he knows how to perform the ceremony) without being entitled to do so. His acting would not count as marrying the couple, because of his lack of entitlement.
It is, on the other hand, possible for someone to be empowered to do something - for instance marrying a couple - without being practically able to do it (cf. Jones & Sergot 1997, 351):2
... one may imagine circumstances in which it is not practically possible for the priest to marry the couple (because, say, he is sick or otherwise incapacitated), although he is still empowered to do so.
Both the actor and the priest could express themselves in a slightly paradoxical manner: "I can marry you, but I can't." However, they would convey different meanings.
The actor would mean, "I am capable of performing the ceremony, but I am not entitled to marry you." The priest, on the other hand, would mean, "I am entitled to marry you, but I am not capable of performing the ceremony." Saying that someone is entitled to do something, seems - therefore - to be a genuine case of modality.
Let's revisit the example we discussed earlier, "Peter can conclude the building society contract." Suppose we interpret this sentence deontically to mean that he is allowed to conclude the contract. In this case, can expresses the modal force of possibility, and a natural rephrasing would be:
(3)
Given the things that Peter is allowed to do: it is possible for him to conclude the building society contract.
Under this interpretation, the modal operator it is possible that quantifies over a subset of possible worlds that is established by the context. This phenomenon is known as relative modality and has been extensively explored by Angelika Kratzer in a series of papers. According to her view, modal operators depend on different types of intensional contexts and are sensitive to the context of their use:3
Modals are context-dependent expressions since their interpretation depends on a conversational background which usually has to be provided by the utterance situation. Only occasionally do we use phrases like in view of what is known … for referring to conversational backgrounds in an explicit manner. (Kratzer 1981, 42)
Our examples can, therefore, be analyzed such that in (1.a) to (1.d), the modality expressed by the modal adverb can is interpreted against different conversational backgrounds. In (2.a), the context is what we know, in (2.b) it is determined by the actions that Peter is allowed to perform, in (2.c) it is determined by what Peter is capable of doing, and in (2.d) it is determined by what Peter is entitled to do:
(4)
Peter can conclude the building society contract.
a. In view of what is known ...
b. In view of what Peter is allowed to do ...
c. In view of what Peter is capable of doing ...
d. In view of what Peter is entitled to do …… it is possible that Peter concludes the building society contract.
A conversational background is a kind of entity which might be referred to by an utterance of a phrase like in view of what is allowed. What is allowed is different from one situation to another. What is allowed in a certain situation could be represented as a set of propositions. If we consider the different situations as possible worlds, then Kratzer's approach assumes that a conversational background is be construed as a function which assigns sets of propositions to possible worlds.
The meaning of “what is allowed” will then be that funktion from the set of possible worlds W into the power set of of the set of propositions, which assigns to any world w of W the set of all propositions which are allowed in w.
Let's consider the truth conditions of sentences of the form (2.d). From a semantic perspective, such sentences can be analyzed in a model of the form:
(5)
M = <X, W, f, V>
Here, X is a set of persons, W is a set of possible worlds, V is an evaluation for each atomic sentence, and f is a function that assigns to each possible world w a set of possible propositions {pⱼ}, each construed as a set of worlds in which a person x does what he or she is entitled to do in w. This set of propositions, therefore, comprises all the actions that x is entitled to do in a given situation.
The conversational background for a modal utterances expressing entitlements could, therefore, be written as:
(6)
f(x,w) = {pⱼ: x does what x is entitled to do in w}.
Each proposition pⱼ is a set of possible worlds (the worlds in which pⱼ is true). So, interpreting the modal will involve generalizing over the following set of worlds:
(7)
∩f(x,w) = ∩{pⱼ: x does what x is entitled to do in w}
= the set of worlds in which x is entitled to do everything x does
The truth conditions of sentences of the form "A is entitled to do H" can then be formulated as follows:
(8)
[[Entitled(Ha)]] in M, w = 1 iff there is a world w’ ∈ ∩f(a,w) such that w’ ∈ [[(Ha)]].
Assuming, for instance, we live in a world where building society savings are possible, and if Peter is one of the eligible people, then there is a possible world in which Peter concludes the society savings contract. This then makes it true that he can get building society savings, i.e. that he is entitled to conclude such a contract.
Different contexts and worlds generate different functions of the type F. This might not seem exciting, but it is interesting nevertheless because it lets us see that such a function is the sole nature of entitlement.
An institution, whether formalized or not, consists - at least - of a set of roles that are associated with specific actions, and an assignment mechanism that determines who can perform those actions based on their role within the institution.
In informal institutions like family and friendship, roles are typically determined by tradition and mutual expectations. For instance, in a family gathering, the host is typically responsible for inviting the guests, while the guests do not have the authority to do so. Similarly, in a friendship, certain privileges like using informal language may only be extended to close friends and not outsiders.
In semi-formalized institutions like marriage, the assignment of roles as husband or wife requires a formal act, and certain actions are governed by law, such as financial assistance and tax sharing. However, other actions are based on customs and tradition.
In formalized institutions like private companies and public authorities, the assignment mechanism is based on employment contracts and promotions, and the roles are clearly defined in job descriptions and organizational charts. Each role comes with a specific set of actions that can be performed by individuals who occupy that role.
Overall, the assignment of roles and associated actions in an institution can be formal or informal, depending on the context, and the assignment mechanism determines who has the authority to perform certain actions based on their role within the institution.
Formal institutions such as hospitals, for instance, have many different roles, each with specific sets of actions and responsibilities.
Physicians, for instance, diagnose and treat patients. Nurses provide care to patients and assisting physicians in the treatment process. They may administer medication, monitor vital signs, and provide emotional support to patients and their families.
Technicians are responsible for performing various medical tests and procedures, such as X-rays, MRIs, and blood tests. They may also maintain and operate medical equipment, such as ventilators and dialysis machines.
The designation process for these various roles in an hospital involves job interviews, hiring decisions, and promotions.
Pirate ships, on the other hand, were informal institutions that operated outside of the law and were typically organized around a hierarchical structure with a captain at the top. He was the leader of the pirate ship and was making decisions about the ship's course, managing the crew, and overseeing raids.
The quartermaster was managing the ship's supplies, including food, water, and ammunition. He also oversaw the distribution of loot and was responsible for maintaining order among the crew.
The navigator was plotting the ship's course and ensuring that the ship did not run aground or collide with other vessels. He also kept track of the ship's speed and distance traveled.
The gunner was managing the ship's weapons, including cannons and firearms. He oversaw the loading and firing of the ship's guns during raids.
While pirate ships were not as formalized as hospitals, they did have a system of roles and responsibilities that were critical to their success. These roles were designated based on experience, skill, and performance.
The function f, therefore, can be construed as a representation of a certain institutional setting. A number of actions are endowed with entitlements (conprised into roles) and these roles are assigned to specific people.
As one person can be simultaneously assigned to different roles in different formalized and non-formalized institutions, a function of type F can be thought of as a representation of all actions that are part of roles to which a person is assigned in a certain world w.
Functions of type F therefore describe the basic structure of institutions. And these institutions in turn define who is entitled to do what in a certain situation. Institutions, however, involve more than just roles, assignments, and entitlements that follow from them.
My account of authority does not require a comprehensive account of institutions or institutional structures. My hypothesis only requires that there are institutional structures, whether formalized or not, and claims that entitlements rely on them.
The importance of these elements becomes apparent when the legitimacy of authority is a subject of debate. There are at least three different scenarios in which authority can be critizised.
Authority may, firstly, be questioned when a role no longer exists. For instance, after the Russian Bolsheviks overthrew Tsar Nicholas II in February 1917, the position of the Tsar no longer existed, and this meant that Nicholas II was for instance no longer authorized to collect taxes from peasants or give orders to his guard.
Additionally, it is possible to question whether the role in question included a particular action. For instance, in some countries, doctors are authorized to assist terminally ill patients in dying, while in others, they are not. This means that the role of a doctor is codified differently in different countries, and this usually changes over time.
And finally, it is possible to question whether a person is properly assigned to the role that includes a particular action. For example, when Blackbeard tied Whitebeard to the mast, he was not yet the captain. Therefore, when he commanded the crew to set the sails, he was technically doing something he was not yet authorized to do and could be critizised for doing it.
However, on a pirate ship, the processes of role assignment are usually informal, so the crew members may have been uncertain about whether Blackbeard had already inherited the role of Whitebeard. In such a situation, telling someone that he has no say because he is just a cabin boy and not the captain could be dangerous if the matter has already been settled without you noticing.
If we were satisfied at this point, it would mean that authority and entitlement are the same. A person would then have the authority to do what they were entitled to do. This is, however, not the case.
Acceptance
The legitimacy of an action can be disputed based on the underlying institutional framework, as seen in the three previous instances. However, there is also a fourth scenario to consider.
Even if the institutional structure is acknowledged by all parties and the roles are properly defined, the establishment of authority ultimately depends on whether the involved individuals accept the consequences of the action. In other words, even if the rules are clear, it is crucial to consider how the decision will impact the people it affects and whether they are willing to comply with it.
Let's revisit the scenario of Whitebeard being bound to the mast. Despite his status as captain and his entitlement to issue orders, Blackbeard and his allies disregard this and restrain him anyway. As a result, the remainder of the crew may follow suit, effectively rendering Whitebeard's words meaningless.
However, it is important to note that this does not necessarily mean that he has lost his position as captain. Rather, his authority has been temporarily undermined, and it will be up to him to regain control and reaffirm his leadership.
Institutional contexts differ in terms of the effort required to establish authority. Let's think of a classroom. Every teacher is entitled to set classroom rules and expectations, for instance. His or her authority within this settting can be measured by the degree by which those rules really count as expectations for behavior. So you could say that various teachers - despite equal entitlements - are endowed with varying degrees of authority by their students.
What we see in such and similar examples simply has to do with the fact that an institutional structure - even if it is recognized as such - cannot magically turn words into commands or rules. There is no automatism here. Power or authority, even if legitimate, must be enforced.
Entitlement - as I see it - relates to having a right to do something, while authority relates to having the power or control to enforce it.
Authority is, however, not the same as having the power to do something. It refers to the legitimacy to exercise power or control over others, often based on one's position or role. It implies that the actions of a person in authority are generally considered legitimate and appropriate.
Social power, on the other hand, also refers to the ability to exert control over others, but it doesn’t exclude brute force or coercion. It can come from a variety of sources, such as physical strength, wealth, or influence. Unlike authority, power does not necessarily have to be legitimate or accepted by those being governed.
Authority is, therefore, a form of power more closely tied to legitimacy and acceptance, while social power is more about the ability to control others, regardless of whether that control is accepted or legitimate.
Assuming that having authority means having legitimate power, we can understand the "legitimate" aspect of this concept through an analysis of entitlement. Power, on the other hand, is closely related to the ability of the person who holds a right to enforce it.
This ability is influenced by both the individual's own traits and the systemic conditions of the environment in which they operate. For instance, a person's level of determination, assertiveness, and resourcefulness may impact their ability to exercise their rights effectively.
At the same time, external factors such as social norms, legal frameworks, and political structures may facilitate or hinder the individual's authority. When assessing power, it is essential to consider both the personal qualities of the individual and the broader societal context in which they operate.
Consider again the situation in a classroom. The students willingness to accept the teacher’s authority can be influenced by several internal factors, such as knowledge, confidence, and communication skills. External factors such as social norms, political and social structures, school policies, and parental involvement can also have a significant impact on a teacher's ability to establish their authority in the classroom. Similar things apply to Whitebeard and his crew.
We can observe that in some cases, individuals accept a statement and act accordingly, while in other cases, they do not. Ignoring the factors that influence the acceptance of authority, what is the nature of this acceptance?
It cannot be simply reduced to the affected person's compliance. Consider, for example, the following utterance:
(9)
Get off the phone and get to work!
Depending on the context of the interaction, this statement can be perceived as a friendly reminder, an order given under threat, or a direct instruction.
In the first case, a friend may say this to another friend who is distracted while working, and the recipient may see it as a well-intentioned suggestion and start doing their job voluntarily.
In the second case, a gangster may say this to a cab driver after putting a gun to his head, and the recipient may comply out of fear for his life.
In the third case, a supervisor may say this to an employee who is wasting time, and the recipient is expected to accept it as a legitimate demand and start doing his job as part of his work duties.
In all three situations, there’s a compliance of the affected person, but only the third case involves an interaction characterized by authority. The supervisor has the right to give instructions to their subordinates and expect them to be followed. Neither a friend, nor a gangster have a legitimate reason to enforce a certain request or command.
Therefore, accepting authority can be understood as agreeing to receive a legitimate demand from a person or institution that has the right to give it, while not accepting authority means refusing to comply with such demands.
This is my final hypothesis in this post. Let’s summarize this discussion in an updated version of the definition above:
(10)
A person a has authority to do H in context C iff
(i) there is an institution in C according to which H is one of the actions that make up a particular role,
(ii) a holds that role in C,
(iii) a series of claims, legitimized by (i) and (ii), are associated with H and directed at an audience, and
(iv) the audience agrees to these claims through their behavior in response to H.
I'm not entirely satisfied with this definition, mainly for aesthetic reasons. But I believe it contains the essential ingredients. I consider it a little miracle that there is any authority at all, and that it is so easy for people to establish it.
It only takes a group of three hikers, with one - John - being particularly knowledgeable about the area. Once the three agree to consider John as their leader, they have established an institution. Leading a hiking group means determining which path the three will take. And as long as John can do that without anyone complaining, he exercises legitimate power and possesses authority.
Authority is practically everywhere, in the family, in kindergarten, in school, at the doctor's office, at work, on the bus, train, and taxi, in travel groups and choirs. It permeates our entire social life by making cooperation predictable and, therefore, efficient.
Without authority, every encounter with a stranger would be highly marked by uncertainty. Without authority, no ship would ever leave a port, and it probably wouldn't have been built in the first place.
The exercise of authority is an exercise of power. But it is by no means the only form of exercising power. Therefore, I will address the exercise of power separately again. But not now and not here.
Makinson, D. (1986): “On the Formal Representation of Rights Relations”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 15, 403-425
Jones, A.J.I. & M. Sergot (1997): „A Formal Characterization of Insitutionalized Power“, in: Ch.E. Alchourrón & E. Bulygin (Ed.): Normative Systems in Legal and Moral Theory, Berlin, 349-367
Kratzer, Angelika (1978): Semantik der Rede. Kontexttheorie, Modalwörter, Konditionalsätze, Königstein, Ts.; Kratzer, Angelika (1979): “Conditional Necessity and Possibility”, in: Bäuerle, Rainer; Urs Egli & Arnim von Stechow (Hg.): Semantics from different Points of View, Berlin et al., 117-147; Kratzer, Angelika (1981): “The Notional Category of Modality”, in: Eikmeyer, Hans-Jürgen & Hannes Rieser (Hg.): Words, Worlds, and Contexts. New Approaches of Word Semantics, Berlin/ New York, 38-74; Kratzer, Angelika (1991): „Modality“, in: von Stechow, Arnim & Rainer Wunderlich (Hg.): Semantics, Berlin/New York, 639-650